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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
WILLS AND PROBATE
Wills and Probate-Testate Succession-Rights of Adopted
Children. In Trueax v. Black,' the Washington court held that
intention of the testator controlled in determining whether an adopted
child was a "child" within the terms of a will, rejecting the trial court's
conclusion that such intent should be determined in the light of stat-
utes establishing the rights of an adopted child.
The will in question was executed in 1900 and became effective at
the testator's death four years later. Under the terms of the will, certain
property was devised to the testator's daughter for life, with remainder
to her child or children living at her death. In the event she died with-
out children living, the remainder passed to the testator's four sons,
three daughters, and two grandsons, all of whom were named in the
residuary clause.
Twenty-two days after settlement of the estate, the life tenant, who
was past thirty-five and unmarried, adopted her niece, a daughter of
one of the nine remaindermen specifically named. The life tenant died
in 1955 without having a natural child born to her. The successors in
interest to the nine contingent remaindermen brought this action to
have their rights in the property determined. The defendants, who
claimed through the life tenant and the adopted child, prevailed in the
trial court. The trial court held that the governing statute' vested the
same right of inheritance in an adopted child that a child born in lawful
wedlock has by virtue of his natural birth. In view of previous deci-
sions' reflecting a liberal interpretation regarding the rights of adopted
children, the statute was deemed applicable to testate succession as well
as intestate succession.
The cases relied on by the trial court were distinguished on appeal
because they concerned the bearing of adoption statutes upon the
adoptee's right to inherit under intestacy laws or the question of an
153 Wn.2d 537, 335 P.2d 52 (1959).
2 BAL. CODE § 6483: "[The child] ... shall be, to all intents and purposes, the child
and legal heir of his or her adopter or adopters, entitled to all the rights and privileges
and subject to all the obligations of a child of the adopter or adopters begotten in lawful
wedlock ... ." Compare with the present statute, RCW 26.32.140 (1955): "Effect of
Decree of Adoption. [The child] ... shall be, to all intents and purposes, and for all
legal incidents, the child, legal heir, and lawful issue of his or her adopter or adopters,
entitled to all rights and privileges, including the right... to take tnder testamentary
disposition, and subject to all the obligations of a child of the adopter or adopters be-
gotten in lawful wedlock." [Emphasis added.]
3 In re Egley's Estate, 16 Wn.2d 681, 134 P.2d 943 (1943) ; In re Hebb's Estate,
134 Wash. 424, 235 Pac. 974 (1925) ; It re McCorkle's Estate, 128 Wash. 556, 223 Pac.
1038 (1924) ; In re Masterson's Estate, 108 Wash. 307, 183 Pac. 93 (1919) ; Van Brock-
lin v. Wood, 38 Wash. 384, 80 Pac. 530 (1905).
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adopted child being pretermitted in a will. The court chose to rely prin-
cipally on an early Pennsylvania case and a more recent Georgia case.'
Following the reasoning of In re Puterbaugh's Estate,' the court held
that the adoption statute guaranteeing the same right of inheritance to
adopted children as natural born children pertains only to the laws of
intestate succession. Where the donor dies testate, the court's primary
duty was deemed to be that of interpretation of the will in an effort to
ascertain and carry out the intent of the testator. After looking at the
circumstances surrounding the making of the will, the court concluded
that this particular adoptee could not have been intended to take to
the exclusion of those named in the residuary clause.
It is indeed surprising that the court, after evidencing a kindly atti-
tude toward the status of adopted children through a line. of decisions
reaching back more than fifty years, should now adjudicate the rights
of adopted children with regard to testate succession in such a frosty
manner. In 1905, in construing the same adoption statute that was in
effect when the will in question was executed,' the court determined
that the statute conferred more than a right of inheritance.8 The words
of the statute entitling adopted children to all rights and privileges of
a child begotten in lawful wedlock were recognized by the court to
mean exactly that. In In re Masterson's Estate,' the court said that one
of the rights and privileges of a natural child is to inherit from brother
and sister, and if an adopted child does not have the same right, the
effect of the statute0 is denied. The view that an adopted child is
"issue" within the meaning of the statute' was accepted in 1924.12 In
In re Hebb's Estate, an adopted son was held to be a descendant of
his adoptive father within the meaning of the statute' The court went
further than most jurisdictions in In re Egley's Estate.5 It was there
held that an adopted child may inherit from his first adoptive parents
even though subsequently adopted a second time by others. This de-
cision, coupled with a prior one which held that an adopted child may
'In re Puterbaugh's Estate, 261 Pa. 235, 104 AtI. 601 (1918).G Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E2d 420 (1942).
0 261 Pa. 235, 104 AtI. 601 (1918).
7 See note 2 supra.8 Van Brocklin v. Wood, 38 Wash. 384, 80 Pac. 530 (1905).
9 108 Wash. 307, 183 Pac. 93 (1919).
'
0 REm. CoiE § 1699. (The wording of the statute was substantially the same as
BA.. CoDE § 6483 set out in note 2 supra.)
"1 Ibid.
22 In re McCorkle's Estate, 128 Wash. 556, 223 Pac. 1038 (1924).
is 134 Wash. 424, 235 Pac. 974 (1925).
'4 Rym. CoDE § 1699. See note 2 supra.
1516 Wn.2d 681, 134 P.2d 943 (1943).
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inherit from his natural parents or kindred as well as from his adoptive
parents, 6 left the adopted child in a favorable position, since he might
inherit from natural, adoptive, and subsequent adoptive parents.
In spite of this trend, when faced for the first time with the problem
of testate succession of the adopted child under the will of one not the
adopter, the court chose to disregard the statute entirely. Although
accepting the reasoning of In re Puterbaugh's Estate17 and Comer v.
Comer," the court made no effort to compare the adoption statutes of
those jurisdictions with the Washington statute. Previously the court
had recognized differences in the statutes, upon which the cases turn,
to be of prime importance. In In re Hebb's Estate,9 a Texas decision"°
was distinguished because the Texas statute conferred only the rights
and privileges of a legal heir on an adoptee. The Washington court
recognized that the statute of this state was materially different and
declared the Texas case to be of no authority with respect to interpre-
tation of the rights of adopted children under the Washington statute.
An examination of In re Puterbaugh's Estate2 reveals that the stat-
ute in effect at the time the instrument in question was executed was
much narrower than the statute in effect at the time of the execution
of the will in question here. The Pennsylvania statute, as construed,23
conferred the status of an heir upon the adopted child. The question
in the Puterbaugi case was whether the adoptee was a "child" under
the terms of the will. The adoptee could not qualify as a "child" because
the statute did not elevate him to that status. The court could therefore
say that the adoption statute was not controlling, and was of no import-
ance in determining the intent of the testator. When we look to the con-
trolling Washington adoption statute,24 however, we find the broad
language that adopted children are to be considered for "all intents and
purposes" the same as natural born children. The statute confers the
16 In re Roderick's Estate, 158 Wash. 377, 291 Pac. 325 (1930).
17 261 Pa. 235, 104 At. 601 (1918).
18 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E.2d 420 (1942).
19 134 Wash. 424, 235 Pac. 974 (1925).
20 State ex rel. Walton v. Yturria, 109 Tex. 220, 204 S.W. 315 (1918).
21261 Pa. 235, 104 Atl. 601 (1918).
22 Pa. Act of 1887 (P.L. 53 § 1) read in part: "[The adopted child] ... shall have
all the rights of a child and heir of the adopting parent." See note 23, infra.
23 Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304 (1867), in interpreting the Act of 1855, predecessor to
Act of 1887, the court disregarded the word "child" in the statute and declared the
adopted child to be only an heir of his adopted parents. The court determined that
nothing in the statute gave adopted children the right to inherit from collateral relatives
or kindred of the adoptive parent. This interpretation attached to the Act of 1887 and
was followed in subsequent cases until revision of the statute by Act of 1917 (P.L. 429
§ 16 (a)), which gave the adopted child the right to take as a child and heir, "as fully as
if the person adopted had been born a lawful child of the adopting parent ..
24 BAL. CODE § 6483. See note 2 supra.
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status of a child and, contrary to the Pennsylvania statute, elevates
the adoptee to the status necessary to take under the terms of the will
in question. The adoption statute cannot here be rightly disregarded
as of no importance in determining the testator's intent. Rather, the
question becomes whether the testator can be charged with knowledge
of the statute and of the fact that adopted children are thereby elevated
to the same status as natural born children.
It is significant to note that a growing number of jurisdictions have
accepted the reasoning that the statute should be considered in determ-
ining testamentary intention.25 Where the statute gives the adoptee
the necessary status, the testator is presumed to have acted in contem-
plation of the operation of the statute.2" By accepting the rule of the
Puterbaugh case, the court followed one of the few cases in which an
adoption statute was disregarded completely in determining the intent
of the testator." The Pennsylvania statute2" no longer restricts the
adoptee to the status of an heir and now confers all the rights of a
natural child. A recent decision from that jurisdiction29 reflects the
view that an adopted child should be allowed to take as a "child" under
a will, unless the testator has evidenced an intent to exclude him. The
Puterbaugh case is, in its own jurisidiction, but a hollow shell of prece-
dent.
An examination of Comer v. Comer,"0 the second case relied on by
the court, reveals that it was decided on the basis of an even more
narrowly drafted statute."' The statute in effect at the time of the
execution of the instrument in question declared that with regard to
all persons other than the adoptive parents, the adopted child should
stand as if no adoption had taken place. The will under consideration
required the remainderman to be "issue" of the life tenant. It was held
that an adopted child could not be "issue" because the term refers to
25 I1 re Heard's Estate, 49 Cal.2d 514, 319 P.2d 637 (1957). In re Collins' Estate,
393 Pa. 195, 142 A2d 178 (1958). See article in 43 MicHr. L. REv. 901 (1945).
26 it re Stanford's Estate, 49 Cal.2d 120, 315 P.2d 681 (1957) ; Mooney v. Tolles,,
111 Conn. 1, 149 Atl. 515 (1930).
-7 Oler, Construction of Private Instruments Where Adopted Children Are Con-
cerned, 43 MIcH. L. REv. 901, 918 (1945).2 8 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 101, (1950).
29 1?; re Collins' Estate, 393 Pa. 195, 142 A.2d 178 (1958).
30195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E2d 420 (1942).
31 GA. CODE ANN. § 74-404 (1935). "... [T]he relation between... [the adopter]
and the adopted child shall be, as to their rights and liabilities, the relation of parent
and child.... To all other persons the adopted child shall stand as if no such act of
adoption had been taken." This statute was changed by the Act of 1949, p. 1157, to give
adopted children the rights of a natural child, including the right to inherit under the
laws of descent and to take under a will or other instrument unless expressly excluded
therefrom. See GA. CODE ANN. § 74-414 (1958).
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a natural or blood relationship, and adoption is but an artificial relation-
ship. The court then applied the presumption that the law favors keep-
ing property in the line of ancestral descent." The adoption statute
was disregarded.
The Comer case is another example of a situation in which the status
conferred on the adoptee by the statute did not bring him within the
terms of the will. Because of the differences in the wording of the adop-
tion statute when compared with the Washington statute, the reasoning
should not have been relied on for determination of the instant case.
After concluding that the adoption statute did not apply to the
problem of testate succession, the court attempted to determine whether
the testator intended adopted children to take under the terms of his
will. The reasoning of other courts was followed: that no mention of
adopted children in a will must presumptively mean exclusion of such
children." It could have been stated with at least equal force that
mere absence of anticipation of adoption is a neutral element, indicating
only that the testator had no intention either way."' It would then have
been but a short step to say that the overriding intention of the legisla-
ture should not be disregarded. 5 It might also have been declared
that the term "child or children" in the will was a reference to a class,
whose membership was left to future determination. It would then
follow that the testator, evidencing no specific intent, must have had
the general intent that all members of the class qualifying at the time
of distribution should be regarded and included, adoptive children as
well as natural born children. There is also case authority in Wash-
ington for the principle that construction of a will, when necessary,
should conform most nearly to the general laws of inheritance.37
Another of the court's reasons for concluding that the testator did
not contemplate adoption was the fact that the life tenant did not have
any children living at the execution of the instrument. From this fact
the court concluded that the testator's primary objective was to provide
32 Ross v. Bateman, 200 Tenn. 148, 291 S.W.2d 584 (1956), cited by the court, was
based partly on this presumption. The ancestral descent presumption could not be ap-
plied to the facts in the instant case, because the adopted child was of a blood relation-
ship. Even if she were allowed to take, the channel of natural descent would not be
disturbed.
33 In re Wehrhane's Estate, 23 N.J. 205, 128 A.2d 681 (1957) ; and Ross v. Bateman,
.supra note 32, both cited by the court, followed this reasoning.
34 In re Holden's Trust, 207 Minn. 211, 291 N.W. 104 (1940).
35 Haver v. Herder, 96 N. J. Eq. 554, 126 Ati. 661 (1924) ; In re Collins' Estate,
393 Pa. 195, 142 A.2d 178 (1958).
36 In re Collins' Estate, supra note 35.
37 It re Levas' Estate, 33 Wn.2d 530, 206 P.2d 482 (1949) ; In re Lambell's Estate,
200 Wash. 220, 93 P.2d 352 (1939).
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for his daughter during her life and, at her death, to allow his other
children and two grandchildren to share the estate. The court appar-
ently did not consider the possibility that such a person might be more
likely to adopt than to have natural children. It is noteworthy that
support for the conclusion that an adopted child was within the tes-
tator's contemplation has been found in the circumstance that at the
time of execution of the will which referred to another's child or chil-
dren, it was evident that the person mentioned had little prospect of
having natural children.88
The fact that the adoptee was a granddaughter in existence at the
time of execution of the will, but was not provided for, was also import-
ant in the court's determination that the testator did not intend her to
take as a "child" under the will, to the exclusion of named remainder-
men. Absent other facts, a contrary conclusion would be equally justi-
fiable. Could it not be said that the testator would have preferred
adoption of a granddaughter to adoption of a stranger? The fact that
the court narrowed the decision to this particular adoptee, however,
may be an indication that a different approach will be applied in a sub-
sequent case where the adoptee is a stranger to the testator.
One glance in any legal encylopedia or digest will reveal that the
question of whether relationship by adoption is equivalent to relation-
ship by blood has produced a legion of cases. They emanate from vir-
tually every jurisdiction in the country. The opinions vary according
to the status conferred on adoptees by statute and the date the decision
was rendered. Viewed historically or empirically, the result of the
Washington court in this case is in accord with the majority rule, which
might be stated as follows: Unless expressly provided, a child adopted
after the death of the testator is not qualified to take as a "child" under
the terms of a will. Most of the decisions formulating or expounding
this rule, however, were rendered in a less enlightened age, when adop-
tion was neither as common nor as accepted as it is today. With few
exceptions, decisions reflecting the view that an adopted child is not a
"child" under these circumstances were decided in the shadow of an
adoption statute conferring a lesser status on the adoptee than was
required to meet the qualification of the will in question. 9 As before
mentioned, few courts have disregarded the adoption statute entirely
and made their determination solely on the basis of the testator's in-
tent." A strong minority of earlier cases and the most recent decisions
88 Ansonia Nat'l Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 136 AUt. 588 (1927).
9 Oler, supra note 27.4 0 Id. at 918.
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have been more liberal with respect to the rights of adopted children.
There is a trend toward recognition of equal status for natural born
and adoptive children in all respects."
The result in the instant case may have been just as between the
parties, but the court's analysis introduces confusion into this area of
law in Washington. A decision based upon the testator's intent rule
of construction offers no general rule applicable to similar future cases.
Predictability is impossible with this approach. Any guess as to what
was in the testator's mind fifty or sixty years ago is as good as another.
The probabilities are great that the testator did not contemplate the
possibility of adoption in the first place, or his intention one way or
another would have been expressed. By declaring adoption statutes to
be of no effect in determining testate succession, the status of hundreds
of adopted children in the state of Washington has been cast into doubt.
If they have not been specifically provided for in wills, they may be
judicially disinherited in the future should the approach in this case
be followed. It is submitted that the reason for the acceptance by the
court of the testator's intent approach, and the ensuing result of the
case, is to be found in the court's reluctance to sanction power in the
hands of the life tenant to divest the rights of the remaindermen through
use of adoption proceedings. Whether the approach of this decision
will be followed in a situation where this question is not present or
where the adopted child is a stranger to the testator is an open question.
There should be no distinction between testate and intestate succes-
sion under the terms of the adoption statute. This is the view of the
Washington legislature as evidenced by the present statute, 2 prior
statutes4 and the most recent cases in other jurisdictions. 4
LLOYD W. PETERSON
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Workmen's Compensation-Employees for Short Term Are Cov-
ered by Act. In Wilkie v. Department of Labor & Indus.,' the Wash-
ington Supreme Court directly ruled, as it has so often in the past
41 In re Heard's Estate, 49 Cal.2d 514, 319 P.2d 637 (1957) ; In re Stanford's Estate,
49 Cal.2d 120, 315 P.2d 681 (1957) ; In re Collins' Estate, 393 Pa. 195, 142 A.2d 178
(1958).
42 See note 2 supra.
43 See notes 2, 10 supra.
44 See note 41 supra.
153 Wn.2d 371, 334 P.2d 181 (1959).
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